Displaying banner advertisements (in short, ads) on webpages has usually been discussed as an Internet economics topic where a publisher uses auction models to sell an online user's page view to advertisers and the one with the highest bid can have her ad displayed to the user.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, a signi cant development in display advertising is the emergence of RTB. It is a non-guaranteed delivery system in which page views (also called impressions) are bought and sold via programmatic instantaneous auctions [15] . e success of RTB can be largely a ributed to its user targeting and wide access. In RTB, advertisers bid for an impression from their targeted user and this impression can be from any webpage from any ad network or platform. If an advertiser wins the auction, her ad will be selected and be displayed to the user in almost real time.
RTB has two major limitations. e rst limitation is that it can not provide guaranteed delivery to advertisers. erefore, those who want to secure and access future impressions in advance will not be satis ed [29] . e solution is to develop a new system that enables time-dependent allocation and pricing of future impressions. Notable examples include the recently discussed programmatic guarantee and ad options [8] [9] [10] [11] 41] . e second limitation of RTB is that those displayed ads may not t their hosting webpages well due to user targeting. It can be: the ad content is irrelevant to the webpage content; the color of the ad image is too light or dark to su ciently contrast with the webpage color scheme. Ill-ing ads will a ect the e ectiveness of ad branding for the advertiser, or even worse annoy users, and potentially reduce the publisher's webpage visits and revenue. It should be noted that this limitation only exists in display advertising, since sponsored search ads are displayed in terms of textual links where visual e ects are not very important and also these ads are keyword-based which are well matched with the user's search query. In display advertising, this limitation is worth investigating. Firstly, it has received surprisingly li le a ention in the recent studies. Secondly, it is an interesting topic that lies in the area combining the research of marketing, multimedia, recommendation, and Internet economics.
In this paper, we discuss a solution to the second limitation of RTB by proposing a computational framework that optimizes tradeo s among stakeholders. As shown in Fig. 1 , the framework has two stages. e rst stage is based on the existing ad auction model used in RTB; and the second stage re-ranks ads based on the optimal trade-o s. In the re-ranking, there are six metric variables: the publisher's revenue, the advertiser's utility, the ad memorability, the ad CTR, the contextual relevance and the visual saliency. Revenue is always the key concern for the publisher. From an advertiser's perspective, her utility is the short-term bene t and the ad memorability is the long-term bene t. e rest three metric variables represent the user's bene ts. Under the proposed framework, we discuss an algorithm that determines the optimal weights of the metric variables. In the paper, we validate the proposed framework on several datasets, including ad auction datasets and multimedia datasets. e ground truth and possible weights combinations for re-ranking are discussed. Our experimental results show that a slight decrease in the publisher's revenue can increase the performance of other variables signi cantly in the short term, which will also improve the engagements of both advertisers and users in the long term, and further increase the publisher's revenue. is paper has two major contributions. Firstly, the user's bene ts have been taken into account. is is similar to the work of Bachrach et al. [3] . Compared to their work, we increase the dimension of bene ts by discussing trade-o s among stakeholders' multiple bene ts. e framework is also tailored to RTB rather than sponsored search. Our proposed model can be regarded as a generalized framework that non-guaranteedly deliveries banner ads in RTB. Secondly, multimedia metrics have been introduced to measure some stakeholders' bene ts, such as the ad memorability, the contextual relevance, and the visual saliency. ese metrics naturally t display banner ads but have not yet been discussed along with auction models in previous studies. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst work that combines multimedia metrics and auction theory together. e rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 discusses the proposed two-stage framework. Section 4 presents our experimental results, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
RELATED WORK
In online advertising, the generalized second-price (GSP) auction [14, 40] and the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) auction [32] have been widely used on di erent platforms, including display and search domains. Revenue maximization is always the key issue. Lahaie and Pennock [19] proposed to use a squashing parameter to increase revenue of GSP auctions in sponsored search, and then Lahaie and McAfee [18] showed that it can improve social welfare as well. Ostrovsky and Schwarz [30] investigated the e ects of optimal reserve prices for GSP auctions on Yahoo's platform. ompson and Leyton-Brown [39] studied a variety of ways of increasing revenue of GSP auctions, including reserve prices and squashing parameter. Furthermore, Yuan et al. [42] implemented a large scale experiment and empirically compared algorithms of se ing reserve price for maximizing revenue in RTB.
Trade-o s among multiple objectives or stakeholders have been discussed in several works. Likhodedov and Sandholm [23] proposed a framework that linearly combines revenue and social welfare in a single-item auction. Radlinski et al. [34] investigated the optimization of relevance and revenue in sponsored search. Similarily, Liao et al. [22] combined revenue and relevance for video advertising. Lucier et al. [24] discussed the revenue of GSP auction at equilibrium, and demonstrated that revenue can be maximized at a non-envy-free equilibrium that also generates a socially ine cient allocation. Roberts et al. [36] discussed a new ranking algorithm for sponsored search auction that uses reserve prices to order the ads and discussed conditions under which revenue can be increased. Bachrach et al. [3] proposed a framework that linearly combines objectives relevant to the search engine (revenue), the advertiser (welfare), and the user (clicks).
Most related advertising research focuses on the economic bene ts, li le a ention has been paid to the advertiser's branding e ectiveness and user's experience. erefore, we introduce several multimedia metrics in this paper. Literature in marketing and consumer psychology has already shown that the contextual relevance between the content of hosting webpage and the ads makes a large di erence in their clickability [7] , and it also has a leading e ect on user's online experience [25] . ere exists rich research on measuring the contextual relevance using textual information. Neto et al. [35] investigated ten strategies for a vector space model and evaluated their e ectiveness individually. Although the vector space model is widely used, a more advanced matching strategy is required due to the vocabulary impedance problem among ads and webpages. Broder et al. [5] proposed an approach for contextual ad matching based on a combination of semantic and syntactic features. Li et al. [21] further measured the contextual relevance by introducing category relevance, keyword relevance, and style relevance. Category relevance measures whether the ad and webpage belong to the same category; keyword relevance measures the relevance between the keywords extracted from ads and webpage; and style relevance measures the style consistency between the ads and webpage. Zhang et al. [44] proposed an advertising keywords recommendation system for short-text webpages with the help of Wikipedia. Other than textual information, images and videos are more popular on the Internet. Chen et al. [13] allocated ads for images through image recognition techniques. To achieve be er contextual relevance, Mei et al. [26, 27] and Guo et al. [16] proposed a multimodal approach which considered both textual and visual relevance for video and image advertising.
Although display banner ads appear on nearly every webpage, their e ectiveness remains debatable.
rough a series of eyetracking experiments, recent research found that users tend to avoid ads in web search and sur ng [4] and they intentionally avoid looking at such ads even when they are designed to be a entiongrabbing [37] . is is also known as ad overlook. Moreover, Owen et al. [31] explored the relationship between ads location and the degree of blindness -the phenomenon of website users actively 
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ω k Weight of metric variable k in the re-ranking, k ∈ K x k, * ,z Value of metric variable k for the selected advertiser in auction z by our proposed model x k,¬,z Value of metric variable k for the selected advertiser in auction z by the SP auction (the ground truth) ξ k,Z Average change of metric variable k of auctions in set Z θ k reshold for the change of metric variable k r s i,z Rank score of advertiser i in auction z r s * ,z Rank score of the selected advertiser in auction z by our proposed model r s ¬,z Rank score of the selected advertiser in auction z by the SP auction (the ground truth) ignore web banner ads -and found that users tend to ignore ads located on the bo om and right area. Intuitively, any ad that fails to capture an user's a ention will be ine ective in delivering information. It has been recognized that there are ve basic stages before a user accepts a message: a ention, comprehension, yielding, retention and action [1] . Motivated by the above observation, in addition to the contextual relevance, we further introduce two other factors to increase user engagement towards banner ads: the visual saliency and the ad image memorability. e former increases the probability that an user will notice the displayed ad while the la er improves an user's brand perception a er she sees the ad image.
THE TWO-STAGE FRAMEWORK
e proposed framework consists of two stages. e rst stage is based on the second-price (SP) auction model. e second stage reranks ads based on the weighted linear combination of bene ts of multiple stakeholders, which ensures the selected ad will optimize the trade-o s among them. For the reader's convenience, the key notations are summarized in Table 1 .
Stage I: Ad Auction
In RTB, the SP auction model has been widely used. Consider auction z ∈ Z , a single impression is bidded by n z advertisers, their cost-per-impression 1 bids are denoted by a bid vector b z = (b 1,z , · · · ,b n z ,z ), and their true values are denoted by a value vector z = ( 1,z , · · · , n z ,z ). In the simplest scenario, the advertiser with the highest bid will be selected and her ad will be displayed to the user. When the ad is displayed, the advertiser then pays the publisher for this page view. In order to re-rank ads in the second stage, we need to know what would be the possible payments from other advertisers. To achieve this, n z − 1 pseudo ad slots are created so that the payments from other advertisers can be estimated.
We denote the auction outcome by { i,j,z ,p i,z } i ∈N z ,j ∈N z ,z ∈Z , where i,j,z is the probability that advertiser i is allocated to slot j in auction z, and p i,z is her payment. Note that slots are ranked so that slot j ≥ 2 is the created pseudo slot. e auction outcome satis es the following conditions:
where I {·} is the indicator function. en advertiser i's payment is
where b (n z +1),z is equal to the reserve price, whose value can be set to be any value between 0 and b (n z ),z .
Stage II: Optimal Re-Ranking
All advertisers are re-ranked in the second stage. e rank score of advertiser i,i ∈ N z , is de ned as follows:
where x k,i,z is the input value of metric variable k, ω k is its weight, and k ∈ K = {1, · · · , 6}. Below we discuss what are these variables, how to obtain their input values and their weights in the re-ranking. Table 2 speci es our metric variables in the re-ranking, including the publisher's revenue, the advertiser' utility, the ad memorability, the ad CTR, the contextual relevance, and the ad saliency. e input values of these metric variables in the second stage are denoted by x k,i,z ,∀k ∈ K, respectively. ey are the normalized values lying between 0 and 1 by using the min-max method for a set of auctions.
Specifications of Metric Variables.
Revenue is always the key issue for the publisher. In rank score rs i,z , it can be measured by advertiser i's (normalized) payment, whose value can be obtained from ad auction in Stage I.
For advertiser i, her bene t can be measured at short-term and long-term levels. e short-term bene t is her utility, which is de ned as the di erence between her value and payment. It shows the advertiser's cost saving. In the long run, the ad's memorability is an important metric, particularly, for branding purpose [28] . It shows how likely the user will remember the advertiser's ad a few weeks or months later. Here we employ the MemNet model [17] to predict visual memorability of ad image. It is a convolutional neural network (CNN) trained in an annotated image memorability dataset, where the input is an ad image and the output is a single real value which indicates the memorability of this image. e higher the value is, the more memorable is the image. e user's bene t can be measured by her page view experience, including the ad CTR, the contextual relevance and the ad saliency [20] . e ad CTR is de ned as the number of clicks on the advertiser's ad divided by the number of displays, whose value is 
MemNet [17] Ad image Memorability score x 3,i,z = normalized score Ad CTR Given by data CTR CTR x 4,i,z = normalized CTR Contextual relevance TakeLab [38] Title, keywords, description Semantic similarity score x 5,i,z = normalized score Ad saliency MBS [43] Web page snapshot, ad image Saliency map and ratio x 6,i,z = normalized ratio usually given by data or can be estimated from historical advertising records. In essence, the ad CTR is an ad quality metric -a high CTR means that the advertiser's ad is a ractive and also more relevant to the user's needs. e contextual relevance measures if the ad content is more or less relevant to its hosting webpage content. If an ad is more relevant, it will be less intrusiveness [27] . In the paper, we use the TakeLab system [38] to measure the semantic similarity of textual contents between the ad and the webpage. TakeLab uses a support vector regression model with multiple features measuring the word-overlap similarity and syntax similarity. e input is two textual sentences and the output is the semantic similarity score. e score ranges from 0 to 5, where 0 indicates irrelevant and 5 indicates totally relevant. We construct the textual information of the webpage and the ad by using the webpage title, keywords and description, etc. An advantage of TakeLab is that it has an outstanding performance in measuring the similarity between short text snippets, while most other algorithms focus on large documents. e ad saliency metric measures whether the ad image can be easily spo ed within its hosting webpage. e more salient ads tend to draw more user's a ention [12] . In the paper, we use the minimum barrier salient (MBS) object detection method [43] to calculate the saliency of the ad image. e input is image screenshots of ad and webpage, and the output is the corresponding saliency map. For each pair of webpage and ad candidate, we embed the ad into the webpage and use the MBS method to compute the saliency map and the saliency score is the mean value of each pixel within the ad area.
Determination of the Optimal
Weights. e weights of variables in the rank score determine the optimal trade-o s. As described earlier, the publisher needs to sacri ce a certain amount of revenue in the short term in order to increase the bene ts of other stakeholders. Let θ 1 be the maximum pre-determined loss rate of revenue and let θ k ,∀k ∈ K\{1}, be the minimum increase rate of other variables. Given the maximum loss and the minimum increase targets, we can obtain the optimal weights from the training set Z .
Our algorithm can be expressed as follows:
max
where rs * ,z is the rank score of the selected advertiser in auction z by our proposed model, ξ k, Z is the mean of changes of variable k between our proposed model and the ground truth, de ned by
where x k, * ,z is the input value of metric variable k for the selected advertiser in auction z by our proposed model, x k,¬,z is the input value of metric variable k for the selected advertiser in auction z in the ground truth. e optimal weights maximize the sum of rank scores of the select advertisers from all auctions in the training set. Eqs. (8)-(9) ensure each variable has an impact in the re-ranking but its impact has an upper bound. Eqs. (10)-(11) further specify the lower bounds of trade-o s where the maximum decrease of the publisher's revenue and the minimum increases for other variables.
Discussion
Display advertising is an interplay among di erent stakeholders. A vigorous and healthy advertising eco-system should consider the bene ts of all stakeholders. Compared with the existing advertising systems that select ads mainly from the publisher's interest, our proposed framework select ads based on the optimized trade-o s among stakeholders.
e incorporated multimedia metrics are computed by the state-of-the-art multimedia techniques, including the MemNet model for the ad image memorability [17] , the TakeLab method for the semantic similarity [37] , and the MBS method for the visual saliency [43] . Moreover, our framework can be extended with more metrics, such as ad interestingness and image aesthetic.
It should be also noted that the proposed two-stage framework does not ensure advertisers to be truth-telling in Stage I. If an advertiser is truth-telling, her utility can be obtained by computing the di erence between her bid and payment. If she is not truth-telling, her value can be learnt from historical ad auctions in Stage I. Value estimation models were discussed by Athey and Nekipelov [2] , and Pin and Key [33] , respectively. Similarly, we can assume each advertiser is optimal -who maximizes her expected utility in the bidding -and then estimate her value from the training data, and the data should be obtained from the two-stage framework rather than the existing RTB campaigns. On the other hand, we think the proposed framework will not signi cantly a ect an advertiser's truthfulness. Firstly, the three multimedia metric variables and the ad CTR are exogenous. ey do not directly a ect an advertiser's bidding behaviour. Secondly, advertisers' payments are computed by creating pseudo slots. If an advertiser is not the winning advertiser in the ground truth but she is selected a er re-ranking, her actual payment in the two-stage framework is equal to the payment from the SP auction without other advertisers who have higher bids than her. Since advertisers' bids are not disclosed, compared to the existing RTB, the winning advertiser has no further information to support her nontruth-telling biddings.
EXPERIMENTS
is section describes our datasets, experimental se ings, variable analysis, sensitivity analysis, and overall results.
Datasets
Four distinct datasets are used in our experiments, including two multimedia datasets and two ad auction datasets. e two multimedia datasets contain the data collected from AOL and YouTube over the period from 06 September to 09 September in 2016. AOL is an article sharing website while YouTube is a video sharing website. e two platforms use di erent ad networks: AOL uses AOL Advertising; YouTube uses Google AdSense. Both datasets were collected in Singapore. As we focus on the single slot ad displaying, each webpage in our datasets contains only one ad slot. We start collecting the data from a particular seed URL that contains multiple categories of content. 2 In this way, the diversity of webpages and banner ads can be ensured. In collecting the data, the web browser is set in the privacy mode, which disables browsing history, web cache and data storage in cookies so that the collected banner ads are not a ected by the previous page views. In each dataset, we extract the ads from their webpages to create a set of banner ads and a set of webpages with blank ad slots. For each webpage, the collected data includes title, keywords, description, whole webpage snapshot, ad image. We also crawl title, keywords and description from the ad landing page (i.e., the delivered webpage if an ad is clicked by the visiting user). Note that we do not consider animation ads in our banner ads. When collecting text information about the webpage for YouTube, we also crawl video tags. All the collected text data can be viewed as a summary about the webpage, which can be used to measure the contextual relevance with ad candidates in experiments. Table 3 describes our multimedia datasets. We collect 5,243 unique webpages from AOL and 7,173 unique webpages from YouTube, and the number of their corresponding unique banner ads are 96 and 539, respectively. Fig. 2 shows the growth trends of unique ads on both platforms. Although there are a large number of impressions in the ad network, only a few ads are displayed. We nd that some ads re-appear from time to time. e repetitive display strategy reinforces users' memory for branding but it also is a source of intrusiveness into users' online experience [6] . e two ad auction datasets contain campaign information for display advertising and sponsored search. Table 4 provides a brief summary of both datasets. For display advertising, the dataset reports 33,043,127 bids in 6,646,643 auctions over 31 ad slots from a medium-size supply-side platform (SSP) in the UK over the period from 08 January 2013 to 14 February 2013. is SSP dataset has also been used in several recent online advertising studies [8, 11, 42] and is used as the major dataset in our experiments. In the other ad auction dataset, the estimated campaign results of 547 keywords were crawled from Microso adCentre (now Bing Ads) over the period from 26 Dec 2011 to 03 Mar 2012. In adCentre, the targeted keywords, budget, and other se ings like matching types were submi ed to the system. It then returned a list of estimated statistics, including the estimated cost-per-click (CPC), clicks, and impressions based on 8 positions, which are ranked from top to bo om in the mainline paid listing and sidebar paid listing of search engine result pages. e Microso dataset provides information of CTRs, which is important in our proposed model but is not included in the SSP dataset. Table 5 summarizes CTRs across keywords in the Microso dataset. Since we focus on the single slot ad displaying, we use the CTR estimated from the rst ad position from the mainline paid listing to simulate the CTR in our experiments.
Experimental Settings
As described in Section 4.1, each of our datasets only provides partial information: the SSP dataset provides advertisers' bids for each auction which can also be used for computing the revenue and the utility; the Microso dataset provides CTR distributions on di erent ad positions; the AOL and YouTube datasets contain screenshots of ads and webpages and their textual descriptions, which can be used to calculate the multimedia metrics such as ad image memorability, the contextual relevance, and the visual saliency. To simulate a real world display advertising environment, we randomly sample and match records and metrics to connect our auction datasets with the multimedia datasets so that each ad will have both bidding campaign records and multimedia metrics. Given a webpage from the multimedia datasets, we use the following ve steps to reproduce its corresponding auction:
Step 1: Sampling an auction in RTB We randomly sample an auction from the SSP dataset. e auction contains a set of advertisers and their bids.
Step 2: Creating the ground truth data Since the given webpage has an ad displayed when it is web crawled. is original ad is considered as the ground truth.
Step 3: Sampling candidate ads Let n denote the number of advertisers in the sampled auction in Step 1. We then randomly sample n − 1 ads from the same Webpage image
Ad images
Variables for re-ranking (a er normalization) multimedia dataset of the webpage. To ensure the uniqueness of each ad in the auction, we exclude the original ad when we sample n − 1 ads from the multimedia dataset.
Step 4: Matching ads and bids We match the n bids with n ads. Since the original ad is displayed, we consider it belongs to the winning advertiser in the auction and match it with the highest bid. e rest n − 1 ads and n − 1 bids are then randomly matched.
Step 5: Simulating CTRs For each ad, we generate its CTR from a uniform distribution in the range of 0 and 13.97‰+ 1.96 × 28.49‰. is is based on the mean and std. of CTRs in the rst position in the Microso dataset, as also shown in Table 5 . e above ve steps allow us to have enough information to compute the mentioned six metric variables for each ad in each auction. We then re-rank ads based on the trade-o s preference, which is expressed in terms of weights. In experiments, we perform the 10-fold cross validation method to obtain the optimal weights as well as to provide the performance analysis.
Variable Analysis
e values of metric variables in the ground truth are examinedthose ads which have been recommended to users under the SP auction model in RTB. For each impression, it contains the publisher's revenue, the advertiser's utility, the ad CTR, and the multimedia variables. Fig. 3 shows the descriptive statistics. e density plots along the diagonal show the distribution of each variable individually; the sca er plots lying in the lower triangular region show how much one variable is a ected by another; and their linear correlations are given in the corresponding areas in the upper triangular part. e sca er plots lying on the bo om row shows the values of each variable under the two platforms and the right column show the variations and outliers of each variable. Note that relevance score ranges from 0 to 5, where 5 indicates most relevant and 0 indicates irrelevant, and the scores of memorability and saliency range from 0 to 1, respectively. Several ndings are worth mentioning. Firstly, many displayed ads in the ground truth data are irrelevant to the contents of their hosting webpages, which will result in less user engagement. Secondly, most of displayed ads are not salient, thus can be easily overlooked. ese two ndings may explain the phenomenon of ad overlook in the existing advertising systems [37] . We also nd that pairwise variables are independent, which allows using linear combination to calculate the rank score for each ad in the auction without considering the correlation matrix. Fig. 4(a) shows the screenshot of the webpage, where ad 3010 (i.e., the ground truth) is displayed on the side bar. Since the sampled RTB auction has 9 advertisers, we further sample 8 candidate ads from the AOL dataset. ey have almost the same width and length as the ground truth ad. However, they have di erent contents, color themes, and descriptions. Fig. 4(a) table exhibits the computed values of variables for re-ranking, where the ground truth has been highlighted in bold. It has the highest value in revenue; and relatively high values in utility, memorability; but small values in CTR, relevance and saliency. Obviously, the ground truth is biased towards the publisher's interest.
Sensitivity Analysis
Radar charts shown in Fig. 4(b) provide a clearer comparison of the ground truth ad with other ad candidates. Each radar chart has multiple axes and each variable is shown as a point on the axis. A point closer to the center on an axis indicates a lower value and vice versa. In radar charts, all values of variables are further normalized into the range between 0 and 1. If all the variables' values of an ad are less than another ad, we call it being strictly dominated because this ad will have no possibility to be selected in the second stage re-ranking. For example, ad 1319 is strictly dominated and its area in the radar chart can be fully covered by ad 3402. Fig. 4(c) shows all possible combinations of the weights in the re-ranking. For each subplot, x-axis represents all the weights instances that make the ad win the auction, and y-axis represents the values of weights in each instance based on stack bars. Note that the subplots of ad 1319 and ad 1847 are empty, indicating that no ma er what weights we choose, these two ads will never be selected in the auction. An ad can be selected if its high valued variables have large weights. Of course, the weights represent the preference of trade-o s and di erent numbers of weights combination instances of ads also tell that they do not have equal chances to be selected in the re-ranking. Although ad 1847 is not strictly dominated in radar charts, it is not been selected in all weights combinations.
is is because most of its variables' values are relatively small and its highest variable value is still less than that of ad 3010. erefore, even when the trade-o s preference is biased towards the ad memorability, the rank score of ad 1847 is still less than ad 3010. We simply call it to be weakly dominated.
Overall Results
We validate the proposed framework by conducting the 10-fold cross validation on both AOL and YouTube datasets. e optimal weights are estimated from the training set; they are then used for re-ranking ads in the auctions in the test set. For simplicity but without lose of generality, the threshold value θ k is set to be zero for any k ∈ K \ {1} so that the e ects of θ 1 can be examined explicitly. As described earlier, θ 1 is the maximum decrease of the publisher's revenue, which indicates how much the publisher would like to sacri ce in order to increase the bene ts of the other two stakeholders. erefore, θ 1 lies in the interval between -1 and 0. ------0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.020 0.004 0.026 0.027 0.021 ------0.001 0.016 0.008 0.081 0.025 0.009 0.002 0.023 0.008 0.092 0.053 0.022 e smaller the value of θ 1 , the more is the increase in the bene ts of other stakeholders. Fig. 5 presents the e ect of θ 1 on the sum of rank scores of the selected advertisers in auctions. When θ 1 decreases, the sum of rank scores increases. is monotone decreasing pa ern is because that the solution space of weights increases if θ 1 decreases (see Section 3.2.2). Also, in the 10-fold cross validation, the size of the training set is 9 times of the test set, the solution space of weights and the sum of rank scores in the training set are roughly 9 times of the test set. e e ects of θ 1 on the changes of metric variables are examined in Fig. 6 . In both AOL and YouTube datasets, the changes of variables in the training data follow the same pa erns as those in the test data. If θ 1 is close to 0, the SP auction (the ground truth) is the optimal solution. is means that our model suggests that the publisher shouldn't sacri ce any revenue. If the publisher further decreases θ 1 , the optimal weights change. ere will be some growth in the variables of other stakeholders, and of course, the publisher's revenue starts to decrease. If θ 1 is small, the publisher's revenue will decrease signi cantly and she may nd it unacceptable. As shown in Fig. 6 , if θ 1 is less than -0.3, it reduces the publisher's revenue by almost 30%. ere is no monotone increasing pa ern in other variables. Analyzing the changes in variables will help the publisher to decide a proper θ 1 . Tables 6-7 further present two special cases: θ 1 = −0.06 for the AOL dataset; and θ 1 = −0.07 for the YouTube dataset. Both cases show the results when the decrease in the publisher's revenue is close to the pre-speci ed threshold value θ 1 . For example, there is about 5.5% decrease in the publisher's revenue in the AOL training set and other variables enjoy certain increases ranging from 2.2% to 27.1%.
CONCLUSION
is paper discusses a two-stage framework that optimizes tradeo s among stakeholders in display advertising. Di erent to many related studies which only focus on the publisher's revenue, we further consider the bene ts of the advertiser and the user by incorporating multimedia metrics. e trade-o s optimization is based on a linear combination of all metric variables and their weights are learnt from data. Variable and sensitivity analysis are conducted to explore the solution space. Our experimental results validate the proposed framework and show that it is able to increase the bene ts of other two stakeholders with just a slight decrease in the publisher's revenue. In the long run, be er engagement of advertisers and users will increase the demand of advertising and supply of webpage visits, which can then boost the publisher's revenue. Future research can potentially discuss a framework which considers a generalised scenario where a webpage has multiple ad slots being separately auctioned o in RTB. e long-term e ects of trade-o s optimization can also be further investigated and it would be very interesting if the framework can be tested over a live se ing.
